Some Fundamental Issues
On the basis of the above discussion, I think that we can draw eight broad conclusions:
- We need to be careful when we describe any proposition as a "Fundamental" Christian Principle. There is no constant in the moral outlook of Christians which a legislator could recognise: Christians frequently disagree but often what they propose is, at best, a reaction to contemporary cultural, political and scientific conditions and, at worst, the pretext to entrench the status quo in power relationships and private preferences. (It is interesting, for example, that Christianity has accommodated much more comfortably to divorce which Jesus specifically forbade than to homosexuality about which he said nothing).
- We need to exercise extreme caution in proposing restrictions on liberty in the sphere of private behaviour, not simply because any general principle of imposition might abridge our own freedom but also because as Christians we believe that we were created to choose to love and to exercise our conscience. (This is quite distinct from legislation to distribute the fruits of social collaboration).
- To propose restrictions on individual behaviour because a situation or technology might be exploited by the wicked would require extreme differentiation rather than general acceptance. We might, for example, quite properly impose restrictions on the carrying of firearms but that is quite different from halting cancer research in case a 'mad' scientist creates a race of monsters.
- Assertion is not enough; any individual or group can make claims based on individual preferences and give these a 'moral' justification.
- We should be careful not to damage the whole superstructure of law by insisting on an individual law that does not command respect. At its best, law is self discipline not imposition.
- There is no ideal relationship between church and state and appeals to theocracy are hollow; there never was such a phenomenon in England, even during the 'High' Middle Ages. The proposal that the legislature should enact specifically Christian legislation on anything rests on an historical myth. Further, the proposal that legislation should be based on outcome is a perfectly respectable paradigm for secular justice operating in an imperfect world but it is a profoundly unchristian principle; we are supposed to value motive and - regardless of the need for secular jurisdiction - leave judgment to God.
- We will have to recognise that there is no right of special pleading. There may well be limited rights of pluralist pleading but that is another matter. Far from being in the vanguard, Anglicans will have to rely on Roman Catholics and Muslims to preserve a special zone for the operation of religious opt-outs.
- It would be much more principled of us to pay for our infringements of just laws than to try to perpetuate unjust laws for our own convenience, so that we can escape from our sacrificial responsibility.
After such a barrage of principles it might be best to end on a rather broader note. If Christians are going to make claims on the secular state they are going to have to be much more rigourous in their claims:
- There is a case for any religious group to live in witness of its god but that fundamental freedom is currently not in doubt. What is in doubt is the extent to which any belief system has a claim to impose its perceived consequences, its moral code, on different or non-believers; but
- Secondly, we need to be self critical; our claim to base our moral imperatives on our fundamental belief system is fragile. We may have a safe foundation in Jesus but if we accept uncritically that the Bible is indivisible that foundation is compromised.
Finally, the moral history of Christianity might be described as the unsuccessful attempt to assert the primacy of love over the power of the church. Our current status as an affirming, rather than a conforming, church gives us the best chance of making headway since the conversion of Constantine but we have not made good start.